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LYSIAS 25 AND THE INTRACTABLE DEMOCRATIC ABUSES 
Nineteenth- and twentieth-century commentators of Lysias have 
more widely disagreed on the persona sustained by an anonymous 
member of the City faction1 in Or. 25, "Defense against a Charge of 
Subverting the Democracy," than on that given any other "speaker" in 
the Lysianic corpus.2 K. J. Dover found in this figure (whom I will call 
X) a "distinctive" individual characterization3 but questioned whether 
Or. 25 could have been intended for delivery before a democratic court: 
"In this case the grounds for suspicion are the high level of generalisa- 
tion maintained throughout the speech, the intellectual aloofness of the 
argument in 8-11, and the assurance of the inimical tone adopted in 25 
towards certain individuals prominent in the closing years of the war."4 
However, though the likely date of composition can be set within nar- 
row limits, Dover makes no effort to evoke the conditions which would 
have made delivery impossible or unlikely in spite of the fact that Athe- 
nian courts historically entertained issues more controversial than any 
raised in this speech.5 I hope to show the point of the "aloofness" and 
'For a recent discussion of such key political terms as 'faction,' 'group,' 'ten- 
dency,' and 'party' and of their uses to describe the shifting, combative alignments of 
fifth- and fourth-century B.C. Athenian political life, see Barry Strauss, Athens after the 
Peloponnesian War: Class, Faction, and Policy 403-386 B.C. (London and Sydney 1986) 
11-36. I am persuaded by Strauss's argument for 'faction' (27-28) as the best term in that 
it gives due emphasis to the importance of the individual leader without excluding consid- 
erations of policy, class, and economic interest. 
2E Blass, Die Attische Beredsamkeit2 I (Leipzig 1887) 515; P. Dobree, Adversaria I 
(Berlin 1831) 247; R. Rauchenstein, Ausgewdhlte Reden des Lysias I (Berlin 1848; rpr. 
Berlin 1963) 64; R. Jebb, The Attic Orators I (London 1876) 254; W. DeVries, A Rhetorical 
Study of the Types of Character in the Orations of Lysias (Baltimore 1892) 28; C. Adams, 
Lysias: Selected Speeches (London 1905; rpr. Norman, Okla. 1976) 260; P. Cloche, La 
restauration democratique d Athenes en 403 avant J.-C. (Paris 1915) 387-94; I. Bruns, 
Das literarische Portrat der Griechen im funften und vierten Jahrhundert vor Christi 
Geburt (Berlin 1896; rpr. Hildesheim 1961) 451. 
3K. J. Dover, Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum (Berkeley 1968) 78: "Personally I 
find the speaker of xxv the most distinctive, but he has not seemed so to others . . . who 
have studied ethos in the orators." Cf. S. Usher, "Individual Characterisation in Lysias," 
Eranos 63 (1965) 119, n. 136. 
4Dover (note 3 above) 188. See note 11 below. 
5According to Lys. 34 (preserved D. H. Lys. 31-33), a proposal of Phormisius to 
restrict the franchise to property owners was introduced shortly after the restoration: in 
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T. M. MURPHY 
argue that Dover has not recognized the role of generalization in the 
speech. 
Dover's view exemplifies a serious deficiency in previous studies, 
their failure to relate Or. 25's rhetorical strategy to political conditions 
at the time of composition. The result has been the ascription by schol- 
ars of now this, now that individual or "dramatic" character to X where 
none is to be found.6 The speech, I argue, is a deliberation on Athenian 
public policy. Although it addresses the case of an individual, X offers a 
defense which covers in effect the entire City faction, rather than him- 
self alone, and which proclaims a policy of expediency not just for 
himself but for his long-suffering faction as well. He therefore needs 
and is given only a generalized political persona. The result is a forensic 
speech whose content is properly deliberative in the technical sense.7 
In undertaking this analysis my aim has not been, in the first 
instance, to uncover the "true" political motivation of the anonymous 
"speaker" or to determine his guilt or innocence of the charges against 
him. I have primarily tried to examine his social and political "image," 
as projected in the speech written for him, on the assumption that this 
image was intended by its author to appeal to the political awareness of 
its audience. 
X invites the court to consider the past decade of catastrophic 
stasis in Athens as the work of an organized system of malfeasance and 
corruption, namely, the radical democracy; under it the relations of 
haves and have-nots have grown increasingly strained, with profit only 
to the sykophantai (24, 32, 34). Comparison of the speech with Ps.- 
Xenophon's Athenaion Politeia and the speech of Diodotus in Thucydi- 
des exposes X's political posture as that of a disaffected aristocrat con- 
ventionally claiming intellectual ascendancy over the democratic rank 
and file and moral ascendancy over current leaders of the restored de- 
this a life-or-death issue was at stake for radical democracy. Whether Lys. 34 was deliv- 
ered or not, the proposal itself is unlikely to have been fabricated by the speechwriter; see 
C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. 
(Oxford 1952; rpr. 1970) 296-97; Cloch6 (note 2 above) 420. 
6 By 'individual characterization' I mean those qualities of literary portrayal which 
seemingly discover to us a distinct individual rather than a type. To discuss individual 
characterization in this sense, Dionysius (Lys. 7, 9, respectively) uses the terms enargeia 
('vividness') and prepon ('propriety'); see C. Carey, Lysias: Selected Speeches (Cam- 
bridge 1989) 10, n. 49. 
7That is, concerned with the expedient, bearing on the future, hortatory; cf. Arist. 
Rh. 1.3.3-6. 
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LYSIAS 25 AND THE INTRACTABLE DEMOCRATIC ABUSES 
mocracy. Contemporary evidence bearing on the gradual nature of the 
restoration to full radical democracy and, in particular, on the balance 
of factions in the impoverished Athenian state is scarce and of uneven 
reliability. It is my hope to have this rather neglected speech of Lysias' 
included among documents expressing the viewpoint of those who 
shied from both extremes, oligarchic and democratic, but especially 
from the latter in the obscure period between the restoration of democ- 
racy and the outbreak of the Corinthian War. 
1. OCCASION AND DATE 
The title of Or. 25, as preserved in the manuscripts, AHMOY 
KATAAYEEQE AIIOAOFIA, "Defense on a Charge of Subverting 
the Democracy," is legally incorrect. I hope to show that the misnomer 
derives from the legitimate insight of an ancient compiler into what the 
speech really says about Athenian democracy. It supposes for audi- 
ence, as the opening address to the jury indicates, an ordinary heliastic 
court of the restored democracy. Presumably (but not explicitly) the 
occasion for X is that of the preliminary scrutiny (dokimasia) required 
of all citizens entering public office (10, 23).8 No office is specified. The 
procedures for a scrutiny did not require candidates to offer proof of 
technical competence for office, but the examiners might find against 
anyone whose support for the laws and democratic constitution of Ath- 
ens they had reason to doubt.9 (Though the testimony of Aristotle and 
Plato suggests that City men might have confidence in the amnesty, 
several passages in the Orators confirm that such charges were often 
heard after 403.)10 The speech assumes that opponents have used the 
8For the requirement see Arist. Ath. 55.2; Aeschin. 3.15; Lys. 15.2. For the occa- 
sion see Blass (note 2 above) 511; Jebb (note 2 above) 250-51; L. Gernet and M. Bizos, 
Lysias: Discours II (Paris 1955) 111; RE 5 (1905) 1270 s.v. dokimasia; Rauchenstein (note 2 
above) 61-62. 
9Arist. Ath. 55.3-4. Cf. the case of Theramenes (Lys. 13.10) and of Mantitheus 
(Lys. 16.3-8, 18), who claims to have provoked antipathy by wearing his hair in the 
aristocratic style. 
'?For the effectiveness of the amnesty see Arist. Ath. 40.2 and Plato Ep. 7.325b. 
But see also Lys. 26.9, 31.26. In Isoc. 18 an oligarch is defendant in a suit brought by a 
democrat at a time when the amnesty is of recent date (36). Further, Lys. 26.9 and Arist. 
55.4 in correlation show how democrats might use the scrutiny process to weed out 
suspected oligarchs without the necessity of a formal charge against them. The law re- 
quired the dikasts to vote on a prospective magistrate even if no one had any public 
545 
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occasion to accuse X of supporting the activities of the Thirty, and on 
that basis to deny his fitness for office; but a lack of evidence sup- 
posedly hampers their case as X claims (5) they have proved him guilty 
of no crime and mentions no specific accusation. We can derive the 
political affiliation of his accusers only in broad terms; some at least are 
leaders of the restored democracy (11). X belittles them collectively as 
sykophantai (3, 24-25, 27, 29)-venal, power-hungry, and self-impor- 
tant (3, 30-31, 34)." He is careful to distinguish them from the most 
influential and illustrious leaders of the Piraeus faction (28). 
On the date of the speech, it is possible to be fairly definite. The 
bitter events associated with the rule of the Thirty Tyrants are still fresh 
enough in democratic memory for the men of the City to be resented (1, 
5, 24, 30, 35); but the democracy has been restored long enough for 
there to be talk of Athens' going to war-against what group or state is 
not specified (30). The "speaker" claims that certain members of the 
Piraeus faction are fostering an aggressive or bellicose foreign policy 
that has caused the city to be "distrusted by the rest of the Greeks" 
(30), and this is most likely a reference to the democracy's violation of 
the accords in the Eleusis affair (9). Since this took place during the 
archonship of Xenainetus (Arist. Ath. 40.4), and if the occasion was 
indeed a scrutiny, Or. 25 was probably composed not sooner than May 
or June (the normal end-of-year time for the scrutiny of incoming offi- 
cials)'2 in 400 B.C. 
questions. In this way oligarchs might be denied office; technically, the amnesty would not 
be violated. X may plausibly have been the object of opportunistic charges that rested on 
little more than guilt by association (2). For a recent treatment of the amnesty see Martin 
Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society and Politics 
in Fifth-Century Athens (Berkeley 1986) 500. 
" It is possible but not certain that the Epigenes, Demophanes, and Cleisthenes 
mentioned in sect. 25 figure as X's accusers on the present occasion. X cites them for 
sykophantia after the fall of the Four Hundred. Without patronymic or demotic, identi- 
fications are elusive. The Cleisthenes accused of being a career sykophantes may be the 
effeminate Cleisthenes ridiculed by Aristophanes at Ach. 118, Eq. 1374, Nu. 355, V 1187, 
Av. 831, Th. 235 and 929, Lys. 1092, Ra. 48, 57, 422. See J. Kirchner, Prosopographia 
Attica (Berlin 1901-3) 8525. There is a slight possibility that Epigenes (Kirchner 4778) is 
the individual satirized by Aristophanes at Ec. 167; but the University of Toronto's Athe- 
nian Project directory lists about two hundred individuals of that name. (I am indebted to 
John Traill for this biographical datum.) Of Demophanes (Kirchner 3651) nothing can be 
conjectured; his is not an especially common name. 
12On the approximate date of composition I follow the view of (note 2 above) Blass 
I 512; Rauchenstein 62; and Cloche 389. 
546 
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2. THE POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF X 
Let us consider first what X has to say about his background, past 
actions, and political affiliation during the decade of Athenian history 
under discussion. 
The period 411-404. He was, he claims, without ambition to be in 
public life; he suffered no misfortune or disability at the hands of the 
radical democracy that would make him desire a change of constitution 
(12). He denies having been one of the Four Hundred in 411 (14). He 
claims to have fought in four sea battles (12). He five times fitted out a 
warship and contributed to many capital levies. He was very wealthy 
and met all his other public expenses with munificence (4, 11-13, 17; cf. 
Antipho. II Tetr. A.3.8). The foregoing brief claims on the court's good- 
will are important because (1) they are all he will say about his activities 
then, and (2) they serve to excuse some sharp criticism of radical de- 
mocracy. 
The period 404/403. In the parts of the speech devoted to this cru- 
cial phase of X's past, he three times urges the jury to judge each person 
on the basis of his actions (4-6, 13, 15). He admits remaining in the asty 
(2-3, 13-14); from this dikasts would infer that he was probably a mem- 
ber of the privileged Three Thousand who retained their citizenship 
under the oligarchy. He does not deny it. Nor does he deny that he was 
also, at least initially, a supporter of the oligarchy in 404/403.13 Had he 
aided the democrats during the civil war, it would have been a most 
valuable point in his favor. In fact, he says, because of the tight control 
exercised by the Thirty, it was impossible for him to help anyone (16). 
Although he seems to say that loyalties shift as an inevitable conse- 
quence of stasis (9), he claims to have been politically inactive through 
the civil war, concerned with preserving his fortune in a time of violent 
upheaval (18). 
X has nothing to say about his actions in 404/403, being content to 
affirm what he did not do.14 He did not (he claims) serve on the Boule or 
13 See (note 2 above) Jebb 253; Cloche 393; and F Ferckel, Lysias und Athen: Des 
Redners politische Stellung zum Gaststaat (Wiirzburg 1937) 95. By 'oligarch,' for the 
period 404/403, I mean any Athenian holding an arche under the Thirty Tyrants, all 
members of the oligarchic Boule, all citizens listed on the catalogue of Three Thousand 
by the Thirty. In other words, I use definite grades of time to construct a definition not 
based on nonquantifiable criteria such as opposition to this or that armed conflict or to so- 
called extreme democracy. 
'4Lys. 25.15-16. Cf. the case of the anonymous defendant in Isoc. 18.16. 
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accept any other position of responsibility in the government. He in- 
scribed no citizen's name on the Thirty's blacklist. He received no 
confiscated property. In short, he denies having harmed anyone during 
the oligarchy-but in a way that tells the jury nothing concrete about his 
activities during the period between the installation of the Thirty and 
the reconciliation of the Piraeus and City factions. (It could be difficult 
to assess responsibility for misdeeds committed under the Thirty, as X 
explicitly says at 13 and implicitly demonstrates at 14.) His "good con- 
duct" then, summed up in the tantalizing phrase, & &xa&ory TvyXaVEL 
:rretay[eLva, is avoidance of criminal activity, while he reckons his 
losses under the Thirty in terms of the prestige that would have been his 
to savor in a viable democracy (13). 
X admits that he stayed in Athens to preserve his possessions (13, 
18). As Jebb noticed, "he even implies a contrast between himself and 
those who had been true to the democracy at its need."'5 On the one 
hand, X claims that he was never disloyal to the democratic government 
while it existed (7). On the other, he aligns himself with the City faction 
in demanding his civic rights under the amnesty (3). He abhors the 
indiscriminate antidemocratic terror practiced by the Thirty. There are 
obviously people in Athens for whom he makes a tempting political 
target (18); but he knows the power of the City faction (32, 34-35) and is 
not afraid to warn the democracy: Threaten our position and no one will 
survive the next round of fighting! (Section 18 shows clearly the side he 
would take; cf. 6.) 
His reticence makes it impossible to fix precisely within the ranks 
of the City faction in 404/403 the political affiliation of this individual, 
whom P. Cloche described as l'une des figures les plus curieuses et les 
plus complexes de l'epoque. Was X in sympathy with one or more of the 
prominent oligarchs? Since X did not find it necessary to flee to Eleusis 
after Munychia with the supporters of the Critias/Charicles faction, he 
probably was not one of their number. He claims to have spent large 
sums and to have fought bravely for Athens in the war with Sparta. He 
espouses a principled respect for the law (3) and harshly blames the 
radical democracy of 410/409 for alleged judicial abuses (26). He can 
hardly have condemned the Thirty's dispatch of the most notorious 
sykophantai from the former democracy (see Xen. HG 2.3.12); on 
the other hand, he was not for persecuting the democratic majority 
(19). 
'5Jebb (note 2 above) I 253. 
548 
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LYSIAS 25 AND THE INTRACTABLE DEMOCRATIC ABUSES 549 
This posture and these views arguably associate X with that sub- 
stantial number of wealthy citizens who in 404 could find no better hope 
for themselves and Athens in her desperate hour than the controversial 
rhetor Theramenes.16 We gauge the breadth of Theramenes' appeal 
from the datum provided by Aristotle (Ath. 34.3) that Archinus, Any- 
tus, Cleitophon, Phormisius, and many others who later served the 
restored democracy were associated with him during the period of con- 
stitutional debate immediately preceding the installation of the Thirty. 
(It is important to recall that the Thirty were created to serve as a 
temporary framing committee for a new constitution, not as a perma- 
nent administration.)17 In Xenophon's account Theramenes aimed at a 
franchise open to all kaloikagathoi furnishing the traditional agatha of a 
hoplite or cavalryman.18 Even if a citizen had actually found favor with 
the people under the radical democracy (as Anytus or Thrasybulus 
had), it was unnecessary to exile him (Xen. HG 2.3.42). This was oligar- 
chy, but of a more inclusive kind than that demanded by Critias and his 
faction (Arist. Ath. 36.1). 
Theramenes could present himself as one who avoided extremes. 
In 411 he persuaded the Athenian assembly to renounce its sovereignty 
(Lys. 12.65; Th. 8.68.4) but soon turned against the oligarchic regime of 
the Four Hundred (Th. 8.89.2, 94.1; Lys. 12.66-67). In 406 he served as 
a trierarch in the naval battle of Arginusae (Xen. HG 1.7.5). He was 
elected strategos for 405/404 but failed the preliminary scrutiny for that 
office, a piece of evidence that well illustrates the Athenians' ambiva- 
lence about him (cf. Lys. 13.10; Aristoph. Ran. 534-41). Theramenes' 
prominence in the government of the Thirty, the fact that he had person- 
ally selected ten of its members, was meant to reassure those citizens 
who belonged to neither political extreme.'9 
It was a reasonable expectation that Theramenes and others used 
to working within the written and unwritten laws of Athenian public life 
would continue to do so, and at first the new oligarchic regime avoided 
taking a high hand with the upper classes (Arist. Ath. 35.2; Diod. 14.4.1- 
2). But when Theramenes himself fell victim to the Thirty's reign of 
terror,20 those who had supported him, men with the profile of X, found 
'6See J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families: 600-300 B.C. (Oxford 1971) no. 
7234; J. Kirchner, Prosopographia Attica (Berlin 1901-3). 
'7Xen. HG 2.3.2, 11; Arist. Ath. 35.1-2; Diod. 14.4.1-2. 
18Xen. HG 2.3.19, 39-40, 47-49. Cf. Lys. 25.4; Plato Rep. 495d-e, 556d, 590c-d. 
19Lys. 12.76; Xen. HG 2.3.17-18; cf. Diod. 14.4.1 on Theramenes' prestige. 
20Xen. HG 2.3.55; Arist. Ath. 37.1; Diod. 14.4.5-5.4. 
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themselves caught between the murderous Critias faction then holding 
the asty and the men of Piraeus besieging it (Arist. Ath. 37.2). X is at 
pains to stress that during the disturbances he and others like him had 
no leadership with whom they could voluntarily identify, and therefore 
little organized factional influence on the terrible course of events (15- 
16).21 
Still, since X chooses to bring under review what he regards as the 
main points of his civic life (as would be expected if he were a citizen 
facing scrutiny [Lys. 16.9]), and since X says that self-interest alone 
determines whether one gives political allegiance to oligarchy or de- 
mocracy (8), we may feel invited to assess him as an individual case, as 
if his own story exemplified the principle at work. But the expectation 
of biographical data is scarcely met; this speech lacks a narrative sec- 
tion answering to the curiosity of democrats about his personal con- 
duct.22 
3. THE DELIBERATIVE CHARACTER OF THE SPEECH 
Instead of individualized ethos we receive a commanding general- 
ization on factional politics. Many commentators have noted in one 
way or another the icy thoroughness with which X derives all political 
and constitutional loyalties from self-interest (8): 
JTQO)Tov gWEV OSv evr0U]9rflvttl X)] OTTl ove66t; EOTV Ctv0@cJTcv (0UEL OiUT? 
6okyL(Xixo6g oier 6rl[toxet(x x6g, T ax. ' ]TLg; av &Exa0oT0 JTOkLTE'oa o(u[tq)@, 
TiOtUTnV JTQo01J[tLTca XacOWTavatl23 
21 X does not mention Theramenes, possibly as a matter of prudence. It would not 
do for him to be too closely tied to any member of the Thirty, even a "moderate" leader 
like Theramenes. (On the authority of Lysias 12.62, one of the Thirty, Eratosthenes, 
facing the statutory audit of his office under the restored democracy, meant to invoke the 
name of Theramenes in his defense.) Indeed, Lysias had a strong personal motive not to 
invoke the name of Theramenes on his client's behalf. Or. 12 paints Theramenes as the 
mastermind behind both oligarchic revolutions and, to that extent, as a culprit in the 
murder of Lysias' brother Polemarchus. See Lys. 12.62-78; cf. 13.9, 17. 
22Mantitheus in Or. 16 is also unforthcoming about his activities in 404/403. Cf. 
Lys. 26.3. 
23" 'Democrats' are simply men who thought that all Athenian citizens should have 
a more or less equal say in the conduct of public affairs": D. M. Macdowell, Andokides: 
On the Mysteries (Oxford 1962; rpr. 1989) 190. 
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The generalization is immediately paraphrased to underscore its impor- 
tance (10): 
oixovv XcXerro0v yv6cvac, &0 avbgQE 6LxaCoTa, OTL ov JTECQi JokLTeicLg Eloiv 
ai J6g &X .Xokk ov Lg laoQQac, akka jrEQgi TCIV i6a cru (jcEQ6vTov exx& p. 
This does not leave him open to the charge of mere opportunism: when 
the men of the City were at war with the men of Piraeus, this wealthy 
citizen accepted the risks of the time and took his stand with the City 
faction.24 Given the near-omission of biographical detail (JTnOTLg tlov 
PLov), given the boast of good conduct under both democracy and- 
impossible to substantiate-the late oligarchy (14, 16-17), and given 
that much more rhetorical energy is spent on the damage that X's ac- 
cusers are doing to Athens than on what they are doing to him, it is my 
thesis that X means for the generalization to be taken in a specific 
factional context, the material wealth and power of the amnestied City 
faction.25 For example, he says that his accusers know perfectly well 
who were the wrongdoers and who were the law-abiding citizens during 
the terror of 404/403 (1): here X has in mind the Spartan-imposed am- 
nesty which specifically exempted from prosecution all but the oligar- 
chic leadership (28).26 Further, the present hearing, whether it is a scru- 
24Cloche (note 2 above) 393. Cf. the defendant in Lys. 31, who is said to have 
retired over the border to Oropus during the civil war, crossing back occasionally to rob 
elderly folk in the countryside (13-19). This is the sort of imputation which X is at pains to 
avoid. Cf. Isoc. 18.47-49. 
25See 25.11, 22-23; cf. Antiphon's argument (II Tetr. A.4.9) that only the unfortu- 
nate poor support revolutions, whereas the rich want stability. J. Ober, Mass and Elite in 
Democratic Athens (Princeton 1989) 266, finds in the generalization at 8 and 10 an assur- 
ance that political loyalties need not be inherited, that aristocrats could support democ- 
racy. However, the Athenian people well knew of their aristocracy not only that it could 
support democracy for prestige and profit but that it in fact had done so for generations 
(Th. 8.48.6). Ober has overlooked the historical background against which the generaliza- 
tion is to be seen, the impoverishment of Athens (Lys. 28.2-3, 34.9). 
26The amnesty offered immunity from prosecution; it did not exculpate (Arist. 
Ath. 39.6; And. 1.87, 94 offers a concrete instance). The speaker of Isoc. 18 admits that the 
Thirty had plenty of help from other Athenians (22-24), and Lysias states that members 
of the City faction for their own profit deliberately refrained from helping people marked 
down by the Thirty (12.49). After Thrasybulus's success at Phyle, the Thirty obliged the 
City faction to join with them in confiscating the goods and property of the citizens of 
Eleusis, whom they murdered after the mockery of a trial. They committed the same sort 
of atrocity on the Salaminians, again sharing the gains with the City faction to deepen 
their complicity (Xen. HG 2.4.8; Lys. 12.52, 13.44; Diod. 14.32.4). The amnesty addressed 
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tiny or not, can hardly threaten him with destruction (5). (He names no 
penalty to which he would be subject if convicted.) The exaggeration 
surely refers to the awkward position of the City faction. At issue, then, 
is not personal accountability and self-interest but collective account- 
ability and collective interest, which is the province of deliberative ora- 
tory.27 Again, when X refers to the possibility of future benefactions, it 
is as a spokesman for the strictly conditional loyalty of his entire faction 
(oi 6la0PEPXyrvoL, 20, 23, 24; tnTL[tOeLEVOL, 32-33). He speaks for the 
privileged group that felt its interests were best served by oligarchy in 
404, that came to have moral reservations about the Thirty, and that is 
now conditionally supportive of democracy. For example, in Lys. 12, 
"Against Eratosthenes," 'polis' and 'democracy' are as good as inter- 
changeable terms; but this wealthy citizen discreetly but clearly distin- 
guishes them (25.11, 25). Is democracy indispensable for all classes all 
of the time? In Or. 12 as spokesman for democracy, Lysias implies that it 
is, but X equivocates (10). The thing to dread from democratic restora- 
tion is not the isolated miscarriage of justice but a second, final round of 
civil war (18). 
4. HISTORICAL PARADEIGMATA 
To illustrate the key generalization at 8 and 10, X reminds the 
court of two notorious demagogoi, Peisander and Phrynichus (9), who 
(he claims) began their political careers as democrats but ended up 
violent oligarchs. 
the question of the legal vulnerability, not the moral responsibility, of the City faction 
(Arist. Ath. 40.1-2). 
27Aristotle observes that deliberative oratory gives reduced scope for personal 
attacks on the adversary, or for remarks about oneself, or for attempts to stir feeling (Rh. 
3.17.10) but increased scope for generalizations such as the expedient (Rh. 1.3.5). 
The speculative suggestion of D. Innes, "Gorgias, Antiphon and Sophistopolis," 
Argumentation 5 (1991) 221-31, that Or. 25, with editing, may have served as a model 
speech "suitable for adaptation by any suspected oligarch taken to trial" (228) can neither 
be proved nor disproved, because it takes us beyond the evidence. However, I question 
whether this sternly worded speech of its time, with more historical particulars and more 
factional nuances than Innes allows, can have been intended for such a purpose. Man- 
titheus in his scrutiny (16.10f.) and Evander in his presumed defense (26.3-5) both assume 
the role of ardent, exemplary citizen, while Philon's presumed defense rests on his un- 
willingness to take either side in the civil war (31.27). None, apparently, uses the approach 
taken by X, which does not make it easier to regard Or. 25 as a plausible model speech. 
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Peisander fled the vengeance of the resurgent democracy in 410, 
condemned to death along with Antiphon and others for his part in the 
oligarchic revolution of the previous year.28 In 411 Peisander supported 
the return of Alcibiades in the assembly (Th. 8.48-49). He argued that 
unless the democratic constitution were modified (t~V TOv aT6ov TQo6JOV 
6YltoxQatovtLevoLg, 8.53.1), Alcibiades could not persuade the Persians 
to switch their funding from the Peloponnesians to the Athenians. Thu- 
cydides in no way suggests that Peisander nursed a grievance against 
the democracy in 411 that might have led him to work for an oligarchy. 
On the contrary, the people appear to have trusted him to the fullest 
extent: they would not otherwise have given him the task of probing the 
mutilation of the Herms in 41529 and would certainly not have made him 
head of an embassy to negotiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades as 
happened in 411 (Th. 8.54.2). 
As a strategos in 411, Phrynichus opposed the recall of Alcibiades 
(Th. 8.48, 50). Plotting to impose an oligarchy, he disclosed to the Spar- 
tan commander Astyochus details of negotiations between the Athe- 
nian conspirators, the satrap Tissaphernes, and Alcibiades, and offered 
to betray the Athenian fleet at Samos. By destroying democracy's 
power to resist Sparta and her allies, he would have made the installa- 
tion of an oligarchy at Athens all but inevitable. Phrynichus saw in 
democracy an evil to be undermined by all available means, including 
internal subversion as planned and carried out by the oligarchic hetai- 
reiai; in oligarchy he found a form of government that would advance 
his own interests and those of the other members of his class (Th. 
8.68.3). 
Both men wanted to reconcentrate in the hands of the kaloikaga- 
thoi the power and wealth which generations of democratic rule had 
caused increasingly to be at the disposal of an "unworthy" popular 
minority.30 The cases of Phrynichus and Peisander, then, fail to illus- 
trate X's principle of constitutional preference. The record cannot be 
invoked to show that either man became an oligarch because the de- 
28Th. 8.54.3-4, 67.3-68.1, 98.1; Lys. 12.66; Arist. Ath. 32.2; see R. Sealey, A His- 
tory of the Greek City States: 700-338 B.C. (Berkeley 1976) 359. 
29And. 1.36; Lys. 12.66 suggests that the people turned against him only when 
convinced that he was an ambitious oligarch masquerading as a democratic rhetor; see 
A. G. Woodhead, "Peisander," AJP 75 (1954) 131-46, esp. 141. From Lys. 7.4 it appears 
that Peisander was a landowner, and from Arist. Ath. 32.2 that he was well-born. 
30Thucydides explicitly says that in 411 the most influential Athenians wanted an 
oligarchy which could win the war for them where democracy had failed (8.48.1). 
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mocracy meant to punish him; and in the case of Peisander, evidence to 
the contrary is strong.31 On the other hand, the truth was more humili- 
ating than X suggests: Phrynichus and Peisander, wolves in sheep's 
clothing, managed the subversion of democracy by constitutional 
means. Their names are a reminder that what has happened once may 
happen again, with radical democrats equally oblivious before the 
event. The overriding point is not that, in general, extremes meet, but 
that they are apt to do so in Athens where the plethos is peculiarly, 
chronically gullible.32 
5. DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROSECUTIONS 
AND THE REVOLUTION OF 404/403 
X cites the democracy for unjust prosecution of certain citizens 
between the fall of the Four Hundred in 410 and the end of the Pelopon- 
nesian War (10-11). Some allegedly were put to death without trial, 
others had their property confiscated, forfeited civic rights, or were 
exiled (25-26). Allegedly, citizens are still being prosecuted for no other 
reason than their wealth (3, 30-31). These abuses are meant to show the 
two oligarchic regimes as consequences of a deep-seated disorder, the 
tendency of the people to heed sykophantai (21, 27). 
Certainly, if we compare the sufferings of the people at the hands 
of the Thirty with the harassment to which a very few of the City faction 
were subjected by the restored democracy-Plato and Aristotle give 
impressive testimony to the democracy's faithful observance of the 
amnesty-we see how incommensurate are the two sets of C6txil- 
a1CT1C.33 A different standard is applied to the democrats from that ap- 
31 See A. Lintott, Violence, Civil Strife, and Revolution in the Classical City (Lon- 
don 1982) 151, 182, n. 37. On Phrynichus see also Ostwald (note 10 above) 348-50, esp. 349, 
n. 50; on Peisander, Ostwald 350. 
32W. Voegelin, Die Diabole bei Lysias (Basel 1943) 139, misses the rhetorical point 
by not bringing into sharper focus the historical context; cf. PI. Rep. 571c-573c. It is 
difficult to believe that in his account of the descent from oligarchic, to democratic, to 
tyrannical man Plato did not have Athenian radical democracy in mind. References to the 
gullibility of the Demos are collected by Ostwald (note 10 above) 225-29. 
33 According to Aristotle, fifteen hundred Athenian citizens died at the hands of the 
Thirty (Ath. 35.4). Isocrates puts the figure of those fleeing Athens for Piraeus in excess of 
five thousand (7.67). This does not keep X from saying that the men of Piraeus are to 
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plied to the rich, whose natural concern was to see their fortunes left 
intact by the democracy. In scale, from a purely judicial point of view, 
the offenses perpetrated by one faction on the other are quite dispropor- 
tionate, given the universally acknowledged brutality of the Thirty. 
However, there is no disproportion if the speaker's coldly rational, non- 
moral point of view is appreciated for what it is,34 part of X's delibera- 
tive persona to be concerned strictly with results in the long term (sage 
counsel at 27; Jr6Xlg tceyaTXrl, 32). 
6. COLLECTIVE PERSONA 
Several considerations lead us to distinguish X's persona as col- 
lective rather than individual. X would have the public take account of a 
distinct political identity, not merely an individual with distinctive per- 
sonal qualities. The rhetorical challenge of the speech is posed not to 
the individual, that he should conform to political expectations of his 
united fellow citizens (cf. Mantitheus in Lys. 16), but to the democratic 
majority, that they had better take thought of factional harmony, or else 
(30). 
The following qualities distinguish X's collective persona: 
(1) Concern with preserving fortunes. In general, X's discussion 
of political loyalties gives little importance to the civil war of 404/403 as 
a theater in which events forced simple black-and-white moral choices 
on all Athenians; on the other hand, X strongly implies that by ille- 
galities perpetrated beforehand the democracy in effect made war upon 
the best citizens, and so brought on its own demise. When comparing 
the relative merits of democracy and oligarchy, X pledges loyalty to 
democracy as long as it is made worthwhile to citizens like himself (8). 
The absolute requirement to preserve wealth and property remains the 
regard the men of the City en bloc as the former regarded themselves during their exile 
(20)-that is, as a group of citizens who receive unfair treatment with the result that the 
accords are undermined. 
34Arist. Rh. 1.3.6. Cf. the speech of Diodotus, whose cold contribution to the 
Mytilenaean debate in Thucydides is introduced with the statement: "We are not judges 
in a court of law; we are a deliberative assembly, and the question is, How can Mytilene be 
most useful to Athens?" (3.44.4). The deliberation over the fate of Mytilene should be 
void of anger (3.42.1, 44.4) and pity, however understandable these emotions (cf. 3.48.1 
and Lys. 25.1). 
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most reliable guarantee of that fundamental political unity among the 
City faction which X takes for granted and for which he feels no need to 
apologize (29). In fact, he assumes that no citizen is a wrongdoer 
merely by virtue of having put himself and his property under the pro- 
tection of an oligarchy (18; cf. Ps.-Xen. 1.5, 14). On the other hand, he 
agrees to meet legitimate charges on his estate; and if the people ad- 
vance him (13), they can trust him.35 He recalls the restoration of de- 
mocracy in 403 as the fruit of a gradual rapprochement of the City 
faction (21-22) with a few reasonable leaders of the Piraeus faction in 
the same social class with himself (28). 
(2) Intellectual superiority (deinos phronein) vis-a-vis the Piraeus 
faction. X does more than strike the customary pose of superiority 
relative to his accusers; he dares to be tolerant of the court itself, 
smugly excusing the notorious emotional excesses and delusions of the 
people.36 In reminding the court that Phrynichus and Peisander were 
demagogoi and that sykophantai would participate enthusiastically in 
oligarchic tyranny, given the chance, he accuses the majority of holding 
its loyal citizens in suspicion (33)37 while historically choosing its lead- 
ers among potential subversives (1, 35; cf. Ps.-Xen. 2.20): in sum, he 
represents the democratic rank and file as knowing that they want de- 
mocracy without knowing whom to trust with the leadership.38 Here 
(he seems to suggest) the upper classes have a contribution to make as 
physicians of the city's ills in time of defeat-this "speaker" would be 
less discreet in citing democratic abuses, more open and topical, if he 
saw no further role for himself in public life. The Thirty committed their 
crimes in the name of positive aristocratic virtues (Lys. 12.5), so X 
35 Nothing in the careful language of Or. 25 suggests that X is currently an implaca- 
ble enemy of democracy per se. He is prepared to live with it if not always to like it, to 
make the best of things (7). Cf. the arguments used by the defendant, Antipho. II Tetr 
A.2.12, who also demands to be believed and cleared on the strength of his benefactions. 
36Cf. 25.32-34, Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.6-8, and what A. W. Gomme called "the 
sympathetic mockery of democracy" at P1. Rep. 555b-558c. The magisterial form hegou- 
mai is used eight times in the course of this brief speech, a record for Lysias (2, 5-7, 11, 17- 
18, 29). Stylistically, the speech makes frequent use of antithesis (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 18, 27, 30). 
37Contrast Lys. 26.1-4, a response from the democratic side to this sort of com- 
plaint. 
3825.11: V0x &alov xCtxa TOTjOV crTOb6XEoOal 6bLa(30OXa, ov6' eav J6avTgT o0 Ta Tqg 
jr6oeog JQa&TTovTEg 6okyaQXxxoig actovTo q(pox)(ov ILvaL. Sometimes a friend of the 
people must say unpopular things, recall the faltering intelligence of the plethos to the 
exigencies of a situation. Cf. Th. 2.65.8-9 on Pericles: Ar. Eq. 1111-20; Xen. HG 2.4.41; 
Lys. 12.86. 
556 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 09 Jun 2015 19:04:41 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
LYSIAS 25 AND THE INTRACTABLE DEMOCRATIC ABUSES 557 
describes the arete of his own class (oo()QovLoTai TOV 6Jlltov) more in 
terms of what it is not-emotional, foolish, incompetent-than of what 
it is. But X identifies the greatest present evil as the democracy's mis- 
treatment of citizens like himself, unfairly made into the scapegoats 
behind whom democratic poneroi take concealment (1). If not permitted 
to use their intelligence for the benefit of the community and for the 
enhancement of their own prestige,39 they (like Timon) want chiefly to 
be left alone.40 
Failure to take into account the financially exhausted state of At- 
tica and the delicate balance between the factions has contributed to 
wide disagreement among scholars over the persona assigned to X. Or. 
25 is that rara avis in the Orators, a polemical defense by an upholder of 
the City faction; but there are no good grounds for assuming it could not 
have been delivered in the tense political climate ca. 400. I conclude 
that X's arguments conform to a common aristocratic practice of con- 
descending, even upbraiding, rhetoric in deliberative speeches (as- 
sumed, for example, in And. 2.27; Lys. 12.87, 26.5). There is nothing 
anomalous in such rhetoric, given the times. Poor judgment on the part 
of the people is rebuked with the reminder that it was the radical demo- 
crats who lost the war with Sparta and emptied the treasury. X bases his 
faction's claim to political prominence on its practical intellectual supe- 
riority over the democratic plethos. 
X, then, sustains a generalized political persona and is not individ- 
ually characterized. Rather, he represents a body of opinion, the City 
faction, whose coherence in Athenian politics persisted for years after 
the overthrow of the Thirty (they were, after all, the better-off citizens 
in an impoverished state). This much is clear from our sources: that the 
transition from a completely discredited oligarchy back to a widely 
discredited radical democracy was neither immediate nor smooth.41 In 
criticizing the intractable abuses of radical democracy, Lys. 25 gives 
concrete expression and point to Aristotle's observation (Ath. 40.1) that 
very many City men feared and distrusted the restored government to 
39X expresses his displeasure with fomenters of the oligarchic-democratic faction 
who favor a war policy, hold offices unconstitutionally, and have suddenly gone from 
poverty to riches (29-31). 
40From 30 it is clear they want no part in any policy that might bring Athens into 
conflict with "the Greeks," that is, with Sparta and her allies. Cf. Hell. Oxy. 6-7 (1-2) on 
the place of this issue in the Athenian politics of 396/395; and I. A. F Bruce, An Historical 
Commentary on the "Hellenica Oxyrhynchia" (Cambridge 1967) 51-54. 
41Hignett (note 5 above) 294-97. 
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the point that they had to be deprived of their option to emigrate by the 
strategem of Archinus. It also shows how a master speechwriter might 
credibly prepare a political defense which is all offense, smoothly 
threatening reprisal for future wrongs, leaving little doubt which faction 
was the better-endowed intellectually and materially, and which was 
the more important to Athens in its present misery.42 We may see this as 
an opportune rhetorical variation on the theme of moral superiority 
which had characterized the aristocratic propaganda of the Thirty Ty- 
rants.43 
T. M. MURPHY 
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, AUSTIN 
42Lys. 21.13, 20; 30.22. 
431 am much indebted to Michael Gagarin for his comments and incisive criticisms 
as this article was being prepared, to the anonymous reviewer, and to Peter Green for his 
assistance with the larger project of which it is a part. 
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